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The
Supreme Court& Democracy Gap
Appeared in the National
Post, August 7, 2003
Author(s): Sylvia
LeRoy, Research Analyst (Email:sylvial@fraserinstitute.ca)
Neil
Seeman, Director of the Canadian Statistical Assessment ( neils@fraserinstitute.ca )
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Release
Date : July 8,2003
AAs word of Judge Fish=s nomination spread through the legal
community,@ reported the Globe and Mail last week, Ahe garnered praise for being wise,
innovative, fair and intelligent, and for having
a polite demeanor.@ Through
gracious media reports of this kind, Canada learned of Quebec Court
of Appeal judge Morris Fish=s elevation to the Supreme Court. The
journalistic
style is revealing: Word of the appointment Aspread,@ like scholarly
scuttlebutt. >Did you hear that Stanley made tenure?= >Did you hear that
Morris made the Supreme Court?=
Counting
Mr. Fish, Mr. Chrétien has now minted six of the nine Supreme Court
justices. There has been no public scrutiny of the process, which is
in effect
a snooty cocktail party affair to which the riffraff electorate is
uninvited.
The Justice Minister entertains an informal consultation process in
which
the views of leading members of the bench and bar are sought, yet
there
is no open or committee discussion in Parliament, and there is no role
for provincial
governments to have any say in the decision, even though the Supreme
Court acts as the referee in disputes between the federal government
and the provinces. We
have a serious democracy gap in the Supreme Court. The people of
Canada
know it (opinion polling consistently shows that Canadians support a
more transparent
judicial selection process). The media know it (editorial writers
strongly support open confirmations). Why are the Supreme Court
justices
so resistant to accountability?
It=s a curious intellectual position for
the justices, many of whom have openly
rebuked greater transparency in the selection process. Although they speak out frequently in public lectures and
media interviews after they are appointed,
they don=t broadcast their more controversial
views on social policy to Parliament before they arrive on the
bench. As
a consequence, new judicially created social policy catches the public
by surprise.
Whether it is same‑sex marriage, euthanasia, or prisoners= voting rights, judicial activism parachutes on to the
public agenda by stealth.
Parliament
then hurriedly patches together a law or amendment to appease the justices. Critics then write frothy letters
to the editor.
Were nominees to signal their views beforehand,
then there would be greater,
more meaningful dialogue between Parliament and the courts. Legal
trends could be anticipated by Parliament, and MPs could then solicit
opinions
from experts and the public, with a view to testing the social and
economic
implications of putative court decisions.
The
system as it now functions gives unelected and unaccountable judges
the power
to hijack the policy agenda. As Prof. Patrick Monahan of Osgoode Hall Law School has noted, the Supreme Court
has become increasingly activist
by striking down government laws, conduct, or decisions. The success
r ate
for Charter of Rights claimants was 63 percent (12 out of 19 cases)
in 2002,
the highest rate in the previous 10 years. As
a result, a great number of government powers and legislative objectives
have been
frustrated by activist judges. Just some of these include: national
security,
cost‑containment, protections against unionization, and the ability to ensure effective police investigations and
law enforcement. What=s more, the Supreme Court of Canada
has increasingly adopted the Acontextual approach@ to judicial interpretation, which
counsels that statutes be interpreted flexibly, with due regard to
Adiversity@ and changing social values, as seen through the eyes of the Court.
There is also an increasing tendency for the judges to look to United Nations= and other international instruments
as a means of adjudicating domestic disputes. Among
the most significant areas of growing judicial activism is equality
rights
law. Madame Justice Beverley McLachlin has written that ACanadian equality
law is in its infancy.@ This is disconcerting, since the meaning
of Aequality@ in Canadian law is undergoing a radical
evolution: In order to
ensure
equal outcomes, equal opportunity has been compromised. Interpreted aggressively by an activist court,
>substantive= equality obliges government to ensure equal outcomes by redistributing
benefits and privileges between individuals and groups.
Consider
a recent case, Auton v. British Columbia, which involved a challenge to the provincial limits on the types
of publicly funded programs for autistic children. The B.C. Court of Appeal
ordered the government to pay
$20,000 in compensation to the four families of the autistic children named in the case, and to fund the full costs
of treatment for the children. Here the Court failed to properly measure the
opportunity costs of judicial policy choices: An order to fund one type of
treatment means fewer resources available for other, potentially more
clinically effective treatment programs. (The appeal to the Supreme Court is
set tentatively for February 2004).
There is no philosophical consistency in activist
decisions. Some decisions, like
Auton, reward litigants with new, positive rights that carry heavy
demands
on the public purse. Other decisions champion a form of what Isaiah Berlin called Anegative liberty,@ where state regulations against the individual are struck down. A more transparent
judicial selection process would enable Canadians to evaluate in advance
the attitudes that nominees hold toward liberty and parliamentary supremacy.
What should really jar all Canadians is how
the judicial branch is growing stronger
relative to other means of shaping the direction of public policy in
Canada.
Voter turnout during national elections is sliding, and the federal
Liberals
have increasingly invoked closure and time restrictions on parliamentary debate.
Meanwhile,
Canadians are clamouring for more public accountability of judges. In 1987, there were 47 formal complaints
to the Canadian Judicial Council. In 1997, there were 202. It=s time to take the critics seriously.
For too long, critics of activism have been
tarred as socially intolerant people who refuse to recognize the Court=s eminence.
This is unfortunate. All these critics want, ourselves included, is
to be
listened to.
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